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lection of other books. This gives the department all of the
reported cases of all the courts of last resort of the various states
of the Union, and all of the Federal courts, for the past twentyfive years, all the English cases since 1650 down to the present
time. Other sets of decisions in the library contain the selected
cases of all State Courts, froni the beginning down to this time.

BOOK REVIEWS
The Principles of Judicial Proof as given by Logic, Psychology,
and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials.
Compiled by John Henry Wigmore, Professor of the Law of
Evidence in Northwestern University, author of "A System
of Evidence in Trials at Common Law," "A Pocket Code
of Evidence," etc. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1913.
One volume, 1179 pages.
The appearance of another book on the subject of Evidente,
by John H. Wigmore, will be welcomed by the bench and bar
and students of the Law generally. His general work upon the
law of- evidence is a monument and has placed him in the van
of trained legal thinkers' and scholars. It will rank among the
works which have produced lasting effect in th'e development of
American jurisprudence, aiding in its reduction to principle scientifically true.
To the presenf book he has given the title, "The Principles
of judicial Proof as given by Logic, Psychology, and General
Experience, and Illustrated by Judicial Trials." Such a careful
and ingenious user of words, one who has a* very unusual gift,
even in the invention of them when desired, must be taken to
have intended, by the use of the word proof, the results and not
the instruments or means of judicial enquiry, a distinction which
he has himself drawn very sharply at the outset. In the introduction he says : "The study of the principles of Evidence, for
a lawyer, falls into two distinct parts. One is Proof in the general sense-the part concerned with the rationatiVe process of
contentious persuasion-mind to mind, counsel to juror, each
partisan seeking to move the mind of the tribunal. The other
part is admissibility-the procedural rules devised by the law,
and based on litigious experience and -tradition, to guard the
tribunal (particularly the jury) against erroneous persuasion.
Hitherto, the latter has become largest in our formal studieshas, in fact, monopolized them; while the former, virtually
ignored, has been left to the chances of later acquisition, casual
and empiric, in the course of practice."
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The question as to the sufficiency of his evidence to lead
the mind of the tribunal to conviction is one of the embarrassments which confront the practitioner at the critical time of
every trial. Persuasion has been deemed to be a gift, a mysterious influence flowing from the born pleader to his auditor, and
acting'as a psychological inhibition upon all impulses antagonistic
to the will and vision of the orator, compelling conviction. It
has been considered the legitimate province of the orator to
bring to bear upon the fact of the transaction his powers of personal influence, so that the most weighty factor in the determination. of causes before juries has beern, not the two premises of
the law and the fact, but the factor-at-large of the personality of
the pleader. This is necessarily based, for its force, upon the
experience of the jury in emotion and observation, which varies
with each jury, each juror, each locality, and each tribunal. For
this reason the matter has been left at large in the law of procedure. Is there a common law of Proof? Are there rules to
govern the process of Persuasion and Conviction, deduced from
general human experience through scientific investigation? Or,
is the conclusion from facts only the subject of fugitive arid casual impulse flowing from temporary and limited individual experience? If Fact A, Fact B, Fact C be severally proved, can we
then say that Fact A plus Fact B plus Fact C = Fact X, or Guilt,
.or Liability?
The results of investigations of the psychologists would seem
to offer hypotheses. Perhaps Mr. Wigmore is right in his position (in the introduction) that "there is, and there must be, a
probative science-the principles of proof-independent of the
artificial rules of procedure; hence it can be and should be studied." He does not contend that these principles are yet so clear
as that they can* be called a formulated science. He says:
"This science, to- be sure, may be as yet imperfectly formulated
or even incapable of formulation. But all the more need is there
to begin in earnest to investigate and develop it. * * * We
must seek to acquire a scientific understanding of the principles
of what may be called 'natural' proof-the hitherto neglected
process. 'If we do not do this, history will repeat itself, and we
shall find ourselves in the present plight of Continental Europe.
* * * Only in-recent times, under the influence of modern science, are they beginning to develop a science of proof."
The author calls attention to the fact that the same thought
has been in the minds of other scientific thinkers. That is,- that
proof is subject to the control and guidance of principle as well
as the admission of testimony, and that there have been other
attempts, more or less praiseworthy.
He mentions, among
others, Burrill's "A Treatise on Circumstantial Evidence;"
Moore's "Facts, or the Weight and Value of Evidence;"
Stephens' "The Principles of Judicial Evidence," and Hans
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He says: "The present work
Gross' "Criminal Psychology."
seems to be the first attempt in English, since Bentham, to call
attention to the principles of judicial Proof (distinguished from
Admissibility) as a whole and as a system. It is therefore tentative. The chief service it aims to fulfill is to emphasize the
subject as a science and stimulate its professional study."
It will be noticed that the work is a compilation. It is evidence of the compiler's scholarship that he has not undertaken
to lay down substantive rules. The main part of the work consists of extracts from various authorities by way of exposition of
topical headings, followed by cases taken from all sources by
way of illustration. There is no effort to generalize or to formulate conclusions from the illustrations. The theory of the author
is that the student of the subject will receive the greatest benefit
through impulse from suggestion to the active exercise of his
own powers in induction. He says: "Though most of the topics
are introduced or followed (as befits a novel subject) by a brief
expository passage, to focus the reader on the possibilities of the
topic, yet the main part of the material may and must be used
inductively. Some of it merely illustrates; but most of it calls
for self-application of the process of analysis and inference.
There is a probative moral to every one of the cases; to point
out in foot notes the moral as conceived by the compiler would
have spoiled the object of the book. The profitable use of the
book will be to employ each illustrative case rigidly as a mental
exercise somehow bearing on the subject where it is classified.
In this field, no one can afford to let another do his thinking
for him."
In his general object, the author has been entirely successful.
The extracts from authors upon each topic have been admirably
selected, and are rich in suggestion to even the casual reader.
They constitute a very comprehensive collection of the very best
thought upon the principles by which to test the value and weigh
the importance of testimony. Such an abundance of exposition
is .not accessible except in a very large and carefully selected
library. Not the least service is that of guide to the literature.
There are generous extracts from Munsterberg, Charles C. Moore,
Arthur Train, Wills, Francis Wellman, Balzac, Dickens, Pinkerton, Ram, Charles Reade, Sully, Whately, Guy M. Whipple and
numerous others.
The illustrative cases consist of anecdotes of personal experience and observation and reported. cases. The collocation is
suggestive and instructive in the extreme. Here is a wealth of
illustration and material for analogy that will be invaluable to
every advocate. Both circumstancial and testimonial evidence
are covered. Authenticated cases are given which make powerfully interesting reading, even for the layman. As an exercise
and drill for the student, they are most carefully arranged and
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presented. Most of the great cases of mystery and difficult proof
are conveniently collected together and classified for probative
moral.
Many of the processes of scientific proof cause the
imaginings of Sherlock Holmes to pale into commonplace.
The third part presents the author's "method of solving a
complex mass of evidence in contentious litigation."
He says:
"The problems in Part III will offer a varied range for testing
the practicability of whatever scheme one may devise. But
some method there ought to be. It seems incredible that advocates can have got along without any through the long period of
judicial annals. What is wanted is simple enough in purposenamely, some method which will enable us to lift into consciousness and to state in words the reasons why a total mass of evidence does or should persuade us to a given conclusion, and why
our conclusion would or should have been different or identical
if some part of that total mass of evidence had been different.
The mind is moved: then can we not explain whty it is moved?
If we can sit down and work out a mathematical equation, why
can we not sit down and work out a mental probative equation?"
The, crux of the author's proposition is rhetorically presented in these two interrogati6ns. Translated into categorical
form, the propositions are: We know that the mind is moved,
therefore we may explain why it is moved; and Since we can sit
down and work out a mathematical equation, theref6re we shall
be able to sit down and work out a mental probative equation.
That either of these conclusions is true is stoutly denied by
philosophers. The problem seems to be one of metaphysics
rather than munidipal law. The author calls attention to the fact
that logicians "have furnished us in plenty with canons of reasoning for specific single inferences; but for a total mass of contentious evidence they have offered no system."
He has the
courage, however, to take a position in opposition to the most
approved authority. For a statement of that opposition, he
quotes W. Stanley Jevons: "The theory of probabilities is the
very guide of life; hardly can we take a step or make a decision
of any kind without correctly or incorrectly making an estimation of probabilities. * * * Attempts to apply the theory of
probability to the results of judicial proceedings have proved of
little value, simply because the conditions are far too intricate.
* * * No mathematical formulas can be framed to express the
real conditions. * * * But such failures in no way diminish
the truth and beauty of the theory itself; in reality; there is no
branch of science in which our symbols can cope with the complexity of nature. * * * The difficulty, in short, is merely relative to our knowledge and skill, and is not absolute or inherent
*in the subject." And Mr. Wigmore comments upon that abstract
.as follows: "If anybody could have performed this service for
judicial evidence, Jevons was the man to do it. His logical
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abacus and logical machine show that he had the.keenest appreciation of the possibilities."
He finally justifies his attempt by
invoking the passage from Locke: "He that will not stir till he
infallibly knows that the business he goes about will succeed, will
have but little else to do but to sit still and perish."
The book is altogether thoroughly interesting, 'suggestive,
entertaining, and agreeably instructive. The author's thoroughgoing sincerity and directness, coupled with his modesty, add to
each of these qualities.
But what is a Mental Probative Equation ?
LYIAN CHALKLEY.

